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Institutional change is guided by rules. In the European Union these rules are given by Art. 250-
252 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. These articles define the actors and rules that bring about
changes in policies in the European Union. We analyze these articles as games in extensive form
and characterize and compare the equilibria of these games. This analysis identifies the decisive
actors the conditions under which it comes to institutional change within the European Union. In
addition we analyze the tendencies for centralization inherent in these decision procedures as well
as their ability to come up with solutions that are a good compromise between all actors.
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1  Introduction
There is an ongoing discussion in the literature on public economics about the consequences of
market integration on national fiscal and social policies like the provision of national public
goods. The literature on tax competition focuses on the consequences of decentralized decision
making on the efficiency of political equilibria, whereas the literature on fiscal federalism focuses
on the optimal allocation of political responsibilities between centralized and decentralized
authorities. (See for example Bordignon, Manasse, and Tabellini (1999), Breyer and Kolmar
(2001), Bucovetsky, Marchand, and Pestieau(1999), Crémer and Pestieau (1996), Lockwood
(1999), and Raff and Wilson (1997). It can be concluded that for a large number of cases political
equilibria can be expected to be inefficient because the combination of integrated markets on the
one hand and decentralized political responsibilities on the other hand induces externalities be-
tween the members of the integrated market.
A second look at this literature, however, reveals that the driving force for the inefficiencies must
be some institutional friction or a form of transaction costs. Since Coase (1960) it has long been
recognized that the existence of externalities is caused by ill-specified property rights or, more
generally, ill defined institutions. In other words, externalities occur only if the possibilities of
agents to bargain up to the Pareto frontier is restricted. To be more specific, the inefficiency of the
political equilibrium in a tax-competition game builds on the implicit assumption that countries
are restricted in their ability to bargain which, in effect, refers to imperfectly designed supra-
national institutions. Different to allocation problems between agents within a country the supra-
national rules shaping incentives of national actors are most likely imperfect, resulting in a situa-
tion of partial anarchy (Anderson and Marcouiller 1997 and Garfinkel and Skaperdas 1997).
There are three approaches from which the design of supra-national institutions can be analyzed.
1.  First by the identification of second-best optimal organization structures given transaction
costs or asymmetric information. This “mechanism design” approach has been applied for ex-
ample by Bordignon, Manasse, and Tabellini (1999) and Lockwood (1999) in order to address
questions like the optimal degree of centralization of political responsibilities in the presence
of asymmetric information. The aim of this approach is to characterize optimal institutions in
the presence of transaction costs.4
2.   Second by the analysis of models incorporating political decision procedures as a means to
explain restrictions to the bargaining process (see for example Alesina and Spolaore 1997,
Hindriks 1999). These models use median voter models to determine the the outcome of a
political game between countries or regions.
3.  Third by the analysis of existing supra-national institutions. The first two approaches rely on
an implicit assumption. The first approach presupposes that all relevant restrictions are incor-
porated in the model in order to make the characterization of institutional structures meaning-
ful. However, why are the institutions that we observe systematically different from, for ex-
ample Groves mechanisms that are the usual solution of the analysis of situations with asym-
metric information? The second approach is able to explain long-term inefficiencies. How-
ever, it is ex ante unclear that the median voter model focuses on the right restrictions of the
bargaining process. Real-world bargaining that should lead to institutional change in the pres-
ence of international externalities is guided by real-world institutions, restricting attention to
median-voter models, while gathering interesting aspects of the problem, somehow throws
out the baby with the bathtub because the incentives provided by real-world institutions can
be analyzed in detail using standard tools of economics.
We will adopt this perspective in this paper and call the institutions that define the legal frame-
work for bargaining and institutional change meta-institutions in the following. Different to the
mechanism-design approach these meta-institutions are assumed to be exogenous explaining in-
stitutional change at the underlying level.
In the European Union the meta-institutions are defined in Art. 250-252 of the Treaty of Amster-
dam. (Art. 189a-c Treaty of Maastricht). These articles define procedures according to which de-
cisions are made. For example in the field of social policy, decisions were made according to Art.
252 (former Art. 189) before the treaty of Amsterdam has been ratified. After its ratification Art
252 has been replaced by Art. 251.
The aim of this paper is to systematically analyze the above mentioned decision making proce-
dures in order to get a better understanding about the strategic incentives induced and the limita-
tions for allocations to be implemented b the means of meta institutions. In order to do so we as-
sume that the decision making procedures can be adequately represented by a game in extensive
form. We can then determine the equilibrium strategies of these games.5
There is an extensive debate about the political incentives induced by Art. 250-252 in the political
science literature. Tsebelis (1994) pioneered this literature. He developed a spacial model of po-
litical preferences in order to explain the role of actors on the european level. A critique and ex-
tension of this work can be found in Moser (1996, 1997). Steunenberg (1994, 1997) also analyzed
the incentive structures induced by Art. 250-252 by the use of a spacial model of political prefer-
ences. A main focus of this literature has been on the relative majorities within the European Par-
liament and the Council of Ministers required for a decision. Especially Art. 251,252 define in-
centives schemes where procedures for preference aggregation within these agencies may change
along the process of decision (from qualified majority to unanimity, for example).
The advantage of these approaches of being very detailed with respect to the decision mecha-
nisms within each actor (the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of
Ministers) implies the disadvantage that these models have to be very simple with respect to
game structure induced by the procedures as such. As we will show in this paper, a detailed and
explicit analysis of the game structure helps gaining further insight into the incentives provided
by the different procedures. In order to allow for this additional degree of freedom, however, we
have to be more restrictive with respect to the procedure of preference aggregation within one of
the decisive actors. We assume that different decision rules to aggregate preferences have no in-
fluence on the ordering of alternatives for each of these actors. In summary, we assume that the
preference ordering of, for example, the European Parliament is the same irrespective of whether
it is the outcome of a qualified majority or of an unanimity procedure. This is without doubt a
strong assumption. However, we think this assumption can be justified because it allows us to
generate insights into the game structure that would otherwise be unable to attain.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we interpret the decision procedures as games in ex-
tensive form and characterize the equilibrium strategies. In Section 3 we apply our findings to the
case of a strategy space that contains three elements and discuss the findings with respect to the
possibility to internalize international externalities. Section 4 concludes.
2  Rational behavior of agents under Art. 250-252
In this section we will analyze the way rational actors will decide in the decision procedures de-
fined in Art. 250-252. The aim is to find a simple characterization of the resulting equilibrium
strategies. Formally, Art. 250-252 can be analyzed as games in extensive form where we look for6
the set of subgame-perfect equilibria. In order to determine the equilibrium strategies of such a
game it will be solved by backward induction. The advantage of such an analysis is that it allows
to systematically reduce complexity of the procedures defined in the articles and to get insight
into the strategic incentives of all the actors involved in the procedures defined in the articles.
Some simplifying assumptions are necessary to generate constructive results. First, Art. 250-252
specify different quorums for the aggregation of preferences of the relevant actors to some deci-
sion. The simple and qualified majority rules and the unanimity rule can be found as collective
decision rules. In order to avoid the problems associated with these differences we assume that
the outcome of the aggregation process of preferences within an institution is not influenced by
the quorum required. Second, we assume that all actors act rationally in the sense that they per-
fectly understand the extensive form of the game and the influence of their decisions on its out-
come. They choose their most preferred alternative. This is common knowledge among all actors
of the game.
We use the following notation to analyze the strategic incentives of all three procedures:
1. We define all relevant actors (players) i , their strategies  P i Pi at each decision stage, and
the order of their moves.
2. We define a choice function uR i(.):Pi   with the following interpretation: if
uP uP P ii ( )( )   Pi at some stage, player i  chooses strategy   P at this stage. If there are
several optimal strategies at this stage, we assume for convenience that the player chooses the
one that maximizes the payoff of the other players. Thus, a choice function is a shortcut for the
underlying aggregation of individual preferences to a collective decision of the institution
called "player i ."
In Art. 252 it is specified that some actors have to be consulted in the process of decision making.
These actors cannot change the outcome of the game and are therefore irrelevant from a rational-
choice perspective. The strategies of other players, however, have an influence on the outcome of
the game. In order to distinguish between these two groups of players it turns out to be helpful to
distinguish between real and formal authority of an actor (Aghion and Tirole 1997):
  an actor has formal authority if there is at least one stage of the game in extensive form where
this player can make a choice,7
  an actor has real authority if he has formal authority and his choice of action can have an in-
fluence on the outcome of the game.
This distinction immediately shows that one implication of our assumption of rationality is that
our analysis can concentrate on players and moves of these players that can have an influence on
the outcome of the game, thus who have real authority. The actors with real authority are for Art.
251,252 the European Commission, the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers,
and for Art. 250 the European Commission (EC) (EP) and the Council of Ministers (CM).
We denote by PEC, PEP, and PCM the preferred alternatives from the set of relevant alternatives of
the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of Ministers respectively.
Psq denotes the status quo policy.
2.1  Decision making under Art. 250
Art 250 defines a simple game between the EC and the CM. It is summarized in Figure 1. The EC
makes a proposal that can either be approved or rejected by the CM. As a result, the CM will ap-
prove any proposal at stage 2 for which  ) ( ) ( sq
CM CM P u P u   is fulfilled. This strategy defines a
participation constraint of the CM that constrains the maximization problem of the EC at stage 1.
European Commission (EC)






Figure 1: Decision making under Art. 250
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It will choose the alternative that maximizes its utility under the restriction that it will not be re-
jected by the CM. We summarize in Result 1.
Result 1: The equilibrium strategy of the game defined by Art 250 is characterized by
the following maximization problem:
) ( ) ( . . ) ( max arg sq
CM CM EC
P
P u P u t s P u P   .
2.2  Decision making under Art. 251
Art. 251 defines a complex game in extensive form that is represented by Figure 2. The EC can
make a proposal Pi that the EP can either accept or modify to proposal Pia. If it is accepted, the
CM can either approve or refuse Pi. In both cases the game ends with either the proposal Pi or the
status quo Psq. If it is amended, the CM can either accept the amendment (Pia is carried out) or
give its position Piap to the EP. In the latter case, the EP can either approve (Piap is carried out) or
reject (Psq is carried out) the position or add further amendments Piapa. In the latter case it is the
EC that can either approve or reject the amendments. In either case it is the CM that has to decide.
However, if Piapa is accepted by the EC, the decision rule is qualified majority, whereas else it is
unanimity. If the proposal is accepted, Piapa is carried out. Else a mediation committee that con-
sists of an equal number of members of both, EP and CM, can make a new proposal Piapap. If it
does not, Psq will not be changed. If it does, both, EP and CM have to accept it. If it is not ac-
cepted by at least one of these parties, the status quo Psq remains in place. Otherwise, Piapap will
be approved.
In order to determine the equilibrium strategies of this game we will solve it by backward induc-
tion. The equilibrium outcome of this game crucially depends on the set of permissible amend-
ments of the original EC proposal. We will analyze two different scenarios:
1. The set of admissible amendments is large. We approximate this case by the assumption
that CM and EP can freely choose from the whole set of alternatives at each stage of the
game.
2. The set of admissible amendments is small. We approximate this case by the assumption




















Figure 2: Decision making under Art. 251
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1. As it is indicated in Figure 2, the game defined by Art. 251 has nine stages. In order to reduce
complexity first note that the move of the EC at stage (5) is without material consequences for the
rest of the game. Both strategies lead to the same continuation of the game. This result stems
from the assumption that preferences of the actors can be specified without recourse to the spe-
cific voting rule. Hence, the position of the EC remains unchanged.
At stage 9 the CM can block any policy that would give it a utility level below the status quo. The
same holds true for the EP at stage 8. Thus, only policies for which
0 P u P u 0 P u P u sq
CM CM
sq
EP EP     ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) (  is fulfilled can pass stages 8 and 9 of the
game.
Next the decision rule of the Mediation Committee at stage (7) has to be specified. As we have
already mentioned it is composed out of an equal number of members of the EP and the CM. Its
task is to find a compromise between both agents. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the
determination of the outcome of these negotiations can be determined by some bargaining game.
Given the continuation of the game at stages 8 and 9, the gains from an agreement are
) ( ) ( ), ( ) ( sq
CM CM
sq
EP EP P u P u P u P u    respectively. We can therefore define a bargaining
function f and the outcome of the bargaining as





iapap P u P u P u P u f P   

.
Anticipating this outcome of the mediation process, the CM will accept Piapa at stage (6) only if
its utility is larger than its utility for Piapap.
As we have already argued, stage (5) is without relevance for the outcome of the game. We can
therefore turn to the analysis of stage (4). At this stage, the EP can either accept Piap defined by
the CM at stage 3 or define its own amendment Piapa. CM’s utility with Piapa cannot be lower than
with Piapap. Hence, the EP solves
) ( ) ( . . ) ( max iapap
CM CM EP
P
P u P u t s P u  .
At stage 3, the CM is in a similar position. It can either accept the amendment made by the EP at
stage (2) or formulate its own position Piap. This can only be successful if it guarantees the EP a11
utility level of at least  ) ( iapap
EP P u  because otherwise it will formulate an amendment at stage (4)
that will lead to the Mediation Committee at stage (7). Hence, CM solves
) ( ) ( . . ) ( max iapap
EP EP CM
P
P u P u t s P u 
at stage (3).
By the same token, nothing changes for the possible amendments of the EP at stage 2. Whatever
strategy it may choose, the CM can at least guarantee itself a level of utility of  ) ( iapap
CM P u .
Hence, the solution of the subgame beginning at stage (2) is determined by the outcome of the
bargaining game at stage (7).
The EC will anticipate this outcome when formulating its proposal at stage (1). This implies that
it will only formulate a proposal if  ) ( ) ( sq
EC
iapap
EC P u P u  . We are now in a position to char-
acterize the equilibrium of the game:
Proposition 2.a: If the set of possible amendments is large, the equilibrium of the game de-
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Please note that the EC will propose the strategy characterized in Proposition 2 at stage (1) and
the game ends at stage (3) after it has been accepted by both, the EP and the CM.
2. If the set of possible amendments is small the calculation of the equilibrium strategy is straight-
forward. Both, the EP and the CM can either stick to the initial EC proposal or reject it. Because
both agents can make a move at a stage where they can veto any proposal that is worse than the
status quo the EC will maximize its utility under the participation constraints of the EP and the
CM.12
Result 2.b: If the set of admissible amendments is small, the equilibrium strategy of
the game defined by Art 251 is characterized by the following maximization problem:
). ( ) (






P u P u
P u P u t s P u P
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2.3  Decision making under Art. 252
Art. 252 also defines a game in extensive form of similar complexity to the one given by Art.
251. It is represented in Figure 3. The EC can start the game by making a proposal  EC P  or stick-
ing to the status quo  sq P . If a proposal is made, the EP can either approve or reject the proposal
or propose amendments. If the EP adopts or rejects the proposal, the CM can adopt or reject the
proposal. In both cases, an adoption leads to the realization of the EC’s proposal whereas a rejec-
tion leads to the status quo. If the EP makes an amendment, the EC can either make a modified
proposal,  CM P , or withdraw the initial proposal. In the latter case, the status quo is realized. If
the EC makes a modified proposal, the CM can either approve this proposal, and it is finally re-
alized. Or it can approve the EC’s initial proposal and this is finally realized. As a third strategy it
can make its own amendments  CM P  and this policy is finally realized. Last, it can reject any of
the EC proposals and the status quo is realized.
In order to analyze the equilibrium strategies of this game first note that it makes no difference
whether the EP adopts or rejects the proposal made by the EC at stage (2). For both strategies the
CM has the same strategies with the same resulting payoffs. Thus, if EP would not have the op-
portunity to propose amendments to the EC proposal, it would not have any real authority.
Whether it in fact has any real authority resulting from this possibility will be analyzed later.
As for the analysis of Art. 251 it makes a crucial difference for the determination of the equilib-
rium strategies whether the set of admissible amendments is large or small. We will start with the
analysis of a large set of admissible amendments.
1. Because the CM can make its own amendment  CM P  at stage (5), it will choose its preferred
alternative out of the set of policies. It will therefore choose  ) ( max arg P u P CM
P
CM  .13
Hence, the EC will make a modified proposal at stage (4) if and only if  ) ( ) ( sq
EC
CM
EC P u P u  .
At stage (3) the CM can either approve or reject the initial EC proposal. It will approve if and
only if  ) ( ) ( sq
CM
EC
CM P u P u  .What is the optimal strategy of the EP at stage (2)? If it ap-
proves or rejects the initial EC proposal alternative PEC or Psq will be realized depending on the
decision of the CM at stage (3). If it adds amendments it will be alternative  CM P  or Psq depend-
ing on the EC strategy at stage (4) that is realized. Hence, in general the EP has real authority: as
EC proposal PEC
initial proposal
Figure 3: Decision making under Art. 252
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soon as the EC proposal undercuts a certain utility level of the EP and the CM, it can switch to
the status quo or the optimal CM proposal. We have to distinguish between the following cases:
I.  u
EC(PCM) > u





CM(PEC): the EP will make an amendment at stage





CM(PEC): the EP will make an amendment at stage





CM(PEC): the EP will not make  an amendment at





CM(Psq): the EP will not make  an amendment at
stage (2), PEC will be realized.
II.  u
EC(PCM) < u





CM(Psq): the EP will make an amendment at stage





CM(Psq): the EP will not make an amendment at
stage (2), PEC will be realized.
3.  u
CM(Psq) > u
CM(PEC): the strategy of the EP is irrelevant for the outcome of the game,
Psq will be realized.
Anticipating the strategies of subgames 2-5 the EC can always make the proposal PCM in cases I.1
and I.2 and proposal PEC  in cases I.4 and II.3. We can summarize with the following result:
Result 3.a: If the set of admissible amendments is large, the equilibrium strategies of
the game defined by Art 189c can be derived by the following maximization problem:
1. If [uEC(PCM)  uEC(Psq)]  [[[uEP(PCM)  uEP(Psq)]  [uCM(Psq) > uCM(PEC)]] 
[[uEP(PCM)  uEP(PEC)]  [uCM(Psq)  uCM(PEC)]]]  P = arg maxP uCM(P).
2. If [uCM(PEC)  uCM(Psq)]  [[[ uEC(PCM)  uEC(Psq)]  [uEP(PEC)  uEP(PCM)]] 
[[uEC(Psq) > uEC(PCM)]  [uEP(PEC)  uEP(Psq)]]]  P = arg maxP uEC(P).
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Figure 4.d16
Result 3.a defines conditions for the structure of preferences of the agents that have to be fulfilled
in order to change the status quo. First of all it can be concluded that the EP, despite its real
authority, is never in a position to actually succeed with its preferred alternative. Condition 1 can
be interpreted as an overall preference similarity. The preference structure necessary for PCM to be
realized in equilibrium is illustrated in Figures 4.a,b. All agents prefer the best policy of the CM
compared to the status quo. In addition to this, the EP prefers PCM  over PEP. This is the crucial
difference to condition 2.1 that is represented in Figure 4.c: the preferences of both, EC and CM,
coincide, however, the EP prefers PEP over PCM. This difference gives a good intuition for the real
authority of the EP: in cases where EC and CM agree that Psq is worse than both, PCM  and PEP, it
is the EP that becomes decisive for the policy to be realized in equilibrium. Figure 4.d represents
condition 2.2. In this situation there is a fundamental conflict of interest between EC and CM
concerning PCM  and the EP prefers PEC  to Psq. There are two possibilities for this scenario indi-
cated by EP (1) and EP (2) in the figure.
2. For the case of a small set of admissible amendments it follows immediately that the EP has no
real authority in the decision process. If PEC = PCM, CM has to choose PEC or Psq  at stage (5).
Thus, the set of strategies is identical for CM for all strategies of EP at stage (2).
Result 3.b: If the set of admissible amendments is small, the equilibrium of the game
defined by Art 189c can be characterized by the following maximization problem
) ( ) ( . . ) ( max arg sq
CM CM EC
P
P u P u t s P u P   .
A comparison of Result 3.b and Result 1 reveals that there is no material difference between the
decision procedures defined by Art. 250 and Art. 252 as long as the set of admissible amendments
is small. The European Parliament has only formal but no real authority and it is still the Euro-
pean Commission that can maximize its interests (under the participation constraint of the CM).
3  Application
The theoretical analysis of the decision procedures defined by Art. 250-252 may give answers to
at least three important questions. We will first analyze differences of the three procedures de-
fined in Art. 250-252 with respect to the expected tendency towards the centralization of political
responsibilities. Second we will figure out the importance of the different agencies, EC, EP, and17
CM, in the different processes. Third we will analyze the outcomes with respect to the deviations
from the most preferred alternatives of the agencies. This gives an idea about the ability of the
different procedures to implement compromises with a minimum degree of conflict between the
agencies.
  In order to do so we will analyze an example with a policy space containing three elements. The
three alternatives  } , , { d p c P   are vicarious for “centralization,” “partial centralization,” and
“decentralization,” where we identify decentralization with the status-quo alternative. This policy
space approximates the current discussion in a number of policy fields where the discuss is
whether political responsibilities remain at the national level (decentralization), which corre-
sponds to the status quo before market integration, or whether they should be centralized to some
degree. With this interpretation partial centralization corresponds to a situation where political
responsibilities remain decentralized but are centrally coordinated. By the same token centraliza-
tion corresponds to a situation where the political responsibility itself shifts from the national to
the European level.
  In order to be more specific we will discuss the interpretation of the different alternatives by the
use of the example of social policy. In the context of social policy, decentralization corresponds
to a situation where the design and structure of social standards like health-care, unemployment,
old-age insurance or security standards is within the responsibility of national authorities. Fur-
thermore, the design of national policies is in no way restricted by a supranational contract. Par-
tial centralization corresponds to a situation where this national responsibility is sauntered by
supranational contracts, for example minimum standards that any national authority has to respect
in the design of its programs. These minimum standards are the central policy measure in the
field of social policy within the European Union. A policy of centralization would correspond to a
situation where national social policies are replaced by a single European system.
In order to answer the above-mentioned questions we have to further specify the concepts of
“tendency for centralization,” “importance of agency,” and “degree of deviation from prefer-
ences.” First we generate equilibrium outcomes by fixing the preference ordering of the European
Commission and look for every permutation of preference orderings of the European Parliament
and the Council of Ministers. For every tupel of preference orderings we then determine the equi-
librium outcomes of the different procedures. This is done using the results from the last section.18
Fixing the preference ordering of the EC has both, a convenience and an empirical aspect. The
fixation restricts the number of permutations to (3·2·1)(3·2·1) = 36. Empirically the specification
of a preference ordering seems to be most robust for the European Commission. It is a bureauc-
racy that is not restricted by re-election constraints of the population of the European Union.
Hence, political-economic arguments would suggest that it will try to maximize influence and
responsibility. This implies that the EC prefers a policy of centralization to a policy of partial
centralization to a policy of decentralization. This is what we assume throughout this section.
However, the political preferences of the EP and the CM are more ambiguous. This is why we
allow for every possible permutation of preferences for these agencies.
1.  Tendency for centralization. There are two ways to determine the expected tendency for
centralization. One can first try to figure out the most plausible preference orderings of the
different agencies and then look for the equilibrium outcomes of the games. Second one can
define a measure for the degree of centralization by counting the number of permutations of
preference orderings for which centralization, partial centralization, or decentralization turns
out to be the equilibrium outcome. We will go both ways in the following.
1.  Importance of agencies. Given the equilibrium outcomes of the procedures for all permuta-
tions of preference orderings we can compare the outcomes with the most-preferred outcomes
of the EC, EP, and CM. We will look for the agency whose most preferred alternative is cho-
sen most frequently. This agency will be called most decisive.
2.  Degree of deviation. The outcome of the different games can differ with respect to the degree
of deviation from the agencies’ preferences. We use the following measure for this degree: if
the equilibrium outcome corresponds to the most preferred alternative of an agency we add 0
to the measure, if it corresponds to the second-most preferred alternative, we add 1, and if it
corresponds to the worst alternative, we add 2. Hence, the measure is distributed on [0,6],
where 0 corresponds to a situation where all agencies agree on the preferred policy and this
policy is chosen in equilibrium, and 6 corresponds to a situation where all agencies have the
same ordering of policies and the worst alternative is chosen in equilibrium.
Table 1.a at the end of the paper summarizes all 36 possible combinations of preferences. Every
row contains one possible preference combination. They are enumerated from 1 to 36. Columns
2-4, 5-7, and 8-10 contain all possible preference orderings of the EC (columns 2-4), the CM19
(columns 5-7), and the EP (columns 8-10). Permutation 10 for example corresponds to a situation
where the CM prefers decentralization over partial centralization over centralization and the EP
centralization over decentralization over partial centralization.
Table 1.b summarizes the equilibrium outcomes of Art. 250-250 for the underlying preference
structures. For both, Art. 251 and Art. 252 we discriminate between the amendment and the no-
amendment case. We know from Proposition 2.a that decision making under Art. 251 depends on
the structure of the bargaining game of the mediation committee if amendments are possible. In
most cases this leads to a definite solution of the game. However, this is not true for permutations
6 and 31. In both cases, the EP and the CM agree that d is worst. Hence, they would approve
both, c and p at stages 8 and 9. However, they disagree about the ordering of c and p. Hence, the
outcome of the bargaining game depends on its specific structure. In order not to impose any such
structure we allow for both alternatives being chosen. This explains tupel {c,p}.
The last three lines count the number of permutations for which centralization, partial centraliza-
tion, and decentralization turn out to be the equilibrium outcomes. We compare the no-
amendment case first. As we already know from Propositions 1 and 3.b, decision making under
Art. 250 and Art. 252 leads to identical results if the set of possible amendments is empty. Both
procedure imply a tendency towards centralization: c is chosen in 18 out of 36 cases. On the other
hand, Art. 251 creates opposite incentives: there is a strong tendency towards the status quo pol-
icy d. The comparison between Art. 250 and Art. 251 remains stable if the set of possible
amendments is large. However, the centralization bias of Art. 252 is reversed: in 19 out of 36
cases it is the decentralized alternative that is realized. Hence, Art. 252 has an intermediate status.
It can furthermore be noted that both, Art. 250 as well as Art. 252 imply an intermediate degree of
polarization between centralization and decentralization.
Result 4: Art. 250 induces the strongest tendency towards centralization whereas Art.
251 induces the strongest tendency towards decentralization. Art. 252 induces inter-
mediate incentives, depending on the set of possible amendments.
  Table 1.c summarizes the deviations of the equilibrium outcomes from the preferences of the
agencies. The last three lines aggregate these measures. In the first of these lines one finds the
aggregate number of deviations, whereas in the second line there is the average deviation. The
last line is the sum of all three average deviations.20
  A comparison of individual average deviations reveals that it is the European Commission that
has to face the largest deviation of its preferences from the political outcome. Especially for Art.
250 this may sound surprising because it is the EC that has the power to make the first proposal.
The result can be explained by the restricted policy space together with the choice of the status-
quo alternative. The smaller the set of policies, the more restrictive becomes the participation
constraints of the CM and/or the EP. In addition to this, the EC’s preferences are directly opposed
to the status-quo alternative d. Both effects imply that the number of cases where the EC can en-
force political changes is severely limited.
  It is the CM that has to accept the smallest deviations of outcomes from preferences for both, Art.
250 as well as Art. 252 independent of the set of possible amendments. The strong position of the
CM stems from its veto power that becomes especially powerful if the number of alternatives is
small.
  It comes as no surprise that it is the EP that has to accept the worst compromise if decisions are
made by the use of Art. 250 and 252 without amendments because of its lack of real authority. By
the same token it is the EC that has to accept the largest deviation under Art. 252 with amend-
ments.
  Result 5: Irrespective of the procedure applied it is the CM that is most decisive in ena-
bling policies, whereas EC and EP have to face larger expected deviations of the equilib-
rium outcome from their actual preferences. The EP faces the least compromise under
Art. 251, whereas the position of the EC is strongest under Art. 250.
  Finally we look at aggregate deviations. It is Art. 250 that minimizes and Art. 252 that maximizes
the aggregate deviation of outcomes from the agencies’ preferences. The strong decentralization
bias of Art. 251 can therefore be explained as a bias towards the status quo. Hence, even in cases
when there might be potential gains from centralization, they can only be realized in a limited
number of cases.
  Result 6: Art. 250 implies the smallest aggregate deviation of preferences from equi-
librium outcomes, whereas Art. 251 implies the largest.21
4  Conclusions
  Institutional design matters in the European Union. It has been the purpose of this paper to ana-
lyze the impact of the institutional design on the outcome of a decision process by the means of
Art. 250-252 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. The purpose has been to analyze the strategic incen-
tives induced by these procedures and to gain insight into the differences in the dynamics of po-
litical change. To be more specific we analyzed the tendency towards changes of the status quo,
the importance of the different agencies involved in the decision procedure, and the degree of
compromise that can be reached by the procedures.
  We can summarize the properties of the decision procedures with respect to all the criteria. Art.
251 is the decision procedure with the largest tendency towards the status quo. It balances the
power of the actors with real authority in a way that makes political change difficult to achieve.
At the same time it is the worst article when it comes to the aggregate degree of compromise. It
seems to be the right decision procedure if only Pareto-improvements shall be implemented. At
the same time it is the procedure with the best protection of the interests of the European Parlia-
ment.
  Art. 250 is the decision procedure with the largest dynamic for change. At the same time it mini-
mizes the aggregate compromise between the actors. It is the decision procedure which is most
favorable for the European Commission.
  Art. 252 gives the Council of Ministers a major role in the game. This decision procedure has an
almost equally good performance with respect to aggregate compromise. It plays an in-between
role between both other procedures.
5  References
Aghion, P. and J. Tirole (1997): “Formal and Real Authority in Organisations”, Journal of Political Economy 105, 1-
29.
Anderson, J.E. and D. Marcouiller (1997): “Trade and Security, I: Anarchy”, NBER Working Paper 6223.
Bordignon, M., P. Manasse and G. Tabellini (1999): “Optimal Regional Redistribution under Asymmetric Informa-
tion”, American Economic Review.
Bucovetsky, S., M. Marchand and P. Pestieau (1999): “`TaxCompetition and Revelation of Preferences for Public
Expenditure”, Journal of Urban Economics 44, 367-390.22
Coase, R.. (1960): “The Problem of Social Cost”, Journal of Law and Economics 3, 1-44.
Cornes, R.C. and E.C.D. Silva (2000): “Local Public Goods, Risk Sharing, and Private Information in Federal Sys-
tems”, Journal of Urban Economics 47, 39-60.
Crémer, H. and P. Pestieau (1996): “Distributive Implications of European Integration”, European Economic Re-
view 40, 747-757.
Crémer, H. and P. Pestieau (1997): “Income Redistribution in an Economic Union: The Trade-Off between Inter-
and Intranational Redistribution”, International Tax and Public Finance 4, 325-334.
Hindriks, J. (1999): “The Consequences of Labor Mobility for Redistribution: Tax vs. Transfer Competition”, Jour-
nal of Public Economics 74, 215-234.
Lockwood, B. (1999): “Inter-regional Insurance with Asymmetric Information”, Journal of Public Economics 72, 1-
39.
Moser, P. (1996): “The European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter: What are the Conditions? A Critique of
Tsebelis (1994)”, American Political Science Review 90 (4), 834-838.
Moser, P. (1997): “A Theory of the Conditional Influence of the European Parliament in the Cooperation Procedure”,
Public Choice 91, 333-350.
Raff, H. and J.D. Wilson (1997): “Income Redistribution with Well-Informed Local Governments”, International Tax
and Public Finance 4, 407-427.
Steunenberg, B. (1994): “Decision Making under Different Institutional Arrangements: Legislation by the European
Community”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150 (4), 642-669.
Steunenberg, B. (1997): “Codecision and its Reform”, in: B. Steunenberg and F. van Vught (eds.): Political Institu-
tions and Public Policy, Kluver, 205-229.
Tsebelis, G. (1994): “The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter”, American Political
Science Review 88 (1), 128-142.
Wildasin, D.E. (2000): “Income Redistribution in a Common Labor Market”, American Economic Review 81, 575-
574.23
EC CM EP
permutation best middle worst best middle worst best middle worst
1c p d c p d c p d





7c p d c p d c d p





























Table 1.a: Permuations of preference orderings for EC, CM, and EP.24
250 251 252
permutation no amendment amendment no amendment amendment
1 c c ccc
2 c c ccc
3 d d ddd
4 d d ddd
5 p p ppp
6c c { c , p } c c
7 c c ccc
8 c c ccc
9 d d ddd
1 0 d d ddd
11 p p {c,p} p d
12 c c c c d
13 c d d c c
14 c d d c c
1 5 d d ddd
1 6 d d ddd
1 7 p d dpd
18 c d d c c
19 c d d c d
20 c d d c d
2 1 d d ddd
2 2 d d ddd
2 3 p d dpd
24 c d d c d
25 c p p c c
26 c p p c c
2 7 d d ddd
2 8 d d ddd
2 9 p p ppp
30 c p p c p
31 c p {c,p} c c
3 2 c p ccc
3 3 d d ddd
3 4 d d ddd
3 5 p p ppp
36 c p p c p
#c: 18 6 {9,6} 18 12
#p: 6 10 {7,10} 6 5
#d: 12 20 {20,20} 12 19
Table 1.b: Equilibrium outcomes25
250 251 252
no am no am
p e r m u t . E CC ME PE CC ME P E C C M E P E CC ME PE CC ME P
1 000000 0 0 0 000000
2 000000 0 0 0 000000
3 202202 2 0 2 202202
4 202202 2 0 2 202202
5 101101 1 0 1 101101
6 011011 { 0 , 1 } { 1 , 0 } { 1 , 1 } 011010
7 000000 0 0 0 000000
8 000000 0 0 0 000000
9 201201 2 0 1 201201
1 0 201201 2 0 1 201201
1 1 102102 { 0 , 1 } { 2 , 0 } { 0 , 2 } 102211
1 2 010010 0 1 0 010221
1 3 001220 2 2 0 001001
1 4 001210 2 1 0 001001
1 5 200200 2 0 0 200200
1 6 200200 2 0 0 200200
1 7 102210 2 1 0 102210
1 8 011220 2 2 0 011012
1 9 002220 2 2 0 002220
2 0 002210 2 1 0 002210
2 1 200200 2 0 0 200200
2 2 200200 2 0 0 200200
2 3 101210 2 1 0 101210
2 4 012220 2 2 0 012220
2 5 002110 1 1 0 002002
2 6 002120 1 2 0 002002
2 7 201201 2 1 0 201201
2 8 201201 2 0 1 201201
2 9 100100 1 0 0 100100
3 0 012100 1 0 0 012100
3 1 001110 { 0 , 1 } { 0 , 1 } { 1 , 0 } 001001
3 2 001120 0 0 1 001001
3 3 202202 2 0 2 202202
3 4 202202 2 0 2 202202
3 5 100100 1 0 0 100100
3 6 011100 1 0 0 011100
dev.: 30 6 35 50 20 16 {47,50} {20,18} {15,18} 30 6 35 43 12 25
av. dev.: 0.83 0.16 0.97 1.39 0.55 0.44 {1.3,1.39} {0.55,0.5} {0.41,0.5} 0.83 0.16 0.97 1,19 0,33 0,69
aggreg.: 1.96 2.38 {2.26,2.39} 1.96 2,22
Table 1.c: Deviations of equilibrium from preferences.